Abstract: South Korea has been pursuing food self-sufficiency using high tariffs and high administrative prices in key agricultural and food markets. Using a dual approach to trade and
economy reasons. One objective of East Asian countries agricultural policy is to transfer income from progressively urbanized consumers to rural areas, to offset the consequences of a rapid industrialization and urbanization (Anderson and Hayami; and Anderson) . One might argue that raising farm incomes and land value, reducing the pace of rural-urban migration and alleviating possible externalities (e.g. congestion of infrastructures) through an implicit taxation of food consumption meet some public finance objectives since rice consumption represents a large and inelastic tax base. However, because the WTO does not recognize political economy as a legitimate reason for subsidizing agriculture, Korea stresses food security motives to justify its agricultural policy.
1 Even though this stated objective is likely to hide other motives, there is evidence that the Korean population is anxious about the supply of food in the future (Kako) .
Korea defines FS as a perplexing joint reliance on trade, domestic production, and selfsufficiency (WTO 2000a,b; 2001b) . Despite some trade concessions under the URAA, Korea has nevertheless openly pursued food self-sufficiency as the desirable way to achieve the stated objective of FS (Sumner; Kako) . FS based on self-sufficiency is a recurrent theme among developing members of the WTO. Less dependence from foreign suppliers is implicit in India's proposal for a "FS" box (WTO 2001a) . Korea makes a strong case that Net Food Importing
Developing Countries (NFIDCs) should be able to support the domestic production of staple crops and argues that such measures should be exempted from reduction commitments, on the grounds of FS (WTO 2001b) . This leading stance echoes developing countries' proposals for 1 Recent policy decisions in the rice sector suggest that the Korean government true objective might be income transfer between social groups, even though it invokes FS as a motivation for farm support. The increased government purchase of rice by after the November 2001 demonstrations against international pressures to cut production subsidies relate more to political economy motivations than to FS objectives. Rice surplus is likely to result (projected 1.4 million tons in 2002, twice the 1999 amount) and end up into food aid shipments.
"FS" and "development" boxes, which would legitimize larger support to domestic production and trade barriers. Recent debates under the auspices of the World Bank (2001) show a large coalition of sympathizers with Korea's position on FS. Free trade, it is argued, is not a guarantee of reliable access to cheap food under all conditions. 2 However, self-sufficiency objectives are detrimental to (poor) consumers because of high food prices, and alternative policies, such as production subsidies, are a more targeted way to achieve FS objectives. Korea and India's promotion of self-sufficiency, which penalizes consumers, seems inconsistent with their endorsement of FS as "access to food for all," proposed during the World Food Summit of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Our paper contributes to the agricultural trade policy debate by providing a rigorous assessment of current agricultural policies in South Korea and, more generally, of FS strategies promoted by many developing economies. In a first step, we abstract from other objectives or concerns motivating the present agricultural policy in Korea. We evaluate the stated policy objectives, i.e. FS, from an economic point of view. A first contribution of our paper is to estimate the welfare costs and trade implications of Korean agricultural policy, using a multimarket dual approach to trade based on Anderson and Neary (1996) . We consider major policy instruments such as tariffs, price support, input subsidies, and consumption taxes. A comparison of these costs since 1979 makes it possible to assess how the policy changes that took place in the 1990s translate into welfare.
Second, Korea is a member of a multilateral trading system based on the most-favorednation clause. The latter implies some import volume expansion as all member countries 2 Several arguments have been put forth. Food aid often decreases when world prices rocket and when aid is most needed. The European Union export tax set on grains in 1996, a poor harvest year, signaled that domestic consumers of exporting countries could matter more than NFIDCs consumers, in case of a grain shortage. Successive U.S. embargoes (e.g., the 1973 soybean exports ban) and the versatile foreign policy of successive U.S. administrations compromise the trust of these countries in world markets.
integrate and expect to gain access to each other's markets as soon as a single member country obtains some trade concession. We measure the degree of restriction, expressed in volume of trade that is generated by Korean agricultural policy, using the "mercantilist" indicator of trade restrictiveness (Anderson and Neary 2000) . This index provides a metric of foregone trade opportunities by other WTO members.
Finally, we estimate how Korea could rationalize its policy instruments for several objectives (self-sufficiency, then production/income transfer). We begin with self-sufficiency in each of the staple crops and meat, and present the structure of second-best consumption taxes and production subsidies, together with their welfare and trade impacts. We then look at FS attained under joint reliance on commodity imports and production targets for various sets of commodities. Because production targets induce income transfer to producers, we provide an evaluation of these implied income-transfers. Transfers are motivated by the domestic politics of rapid industrialization to buffer the adjustment cost of resources flowing out of the rural sector and to mitigate income differentials between rural and urban sectors. We show the sensitivity of the level and nature of protection to the commodity coverage of the target through cross-price effects in production and consumption. We conclude the targeting section by drawing implications on strategic considerations for trade negotiations regarding support levels under the development or FS box.
The policy recommendation punch line of our paper applies to all members of the WTO who, for genuine reasons or for income transfer motives, endorse or contemplate FS objectives, such as the EU policy debate to increase EU self-sufficiency in proteins. These countries should advocate deficiency payments rather than trade barriers for their agricultural production and open their borders simultaneously. This strategy is much less antagonizing than self-sufficiency for trade partners and much more beneficial to consumers and small producers who are net buyers of the targeted commodities. If one considers that FS is mainly a pretense for domestic income transfers, production subsidies are a major step in the right direction toward better-targeted distortions. Policy rents to farmers would be essentially unaffected relative to the current situation, making it possible to satisfy domestic political constraints.
3
The Analytical Framework
We use a multimarket model of Korean agriculture and food markets embedded in a dual approach to trade to estimate the supply and demand response to government intervention and the subsequent welfare effects. Following Anderson and Neary (1996 and 2000) , these distorted markets are treated as being separable from the rest of the economy. The set of policy instruments that is considered here affects the output prices, consumption prices, and input prices. Tariffs and government purchases translate into producer and consumer prices higher than the border price. Input subsidies and direct payments are modeled by lower input prices that are specific to agriculture (fertilizer, irrigation and credit subsidies). Consumption subsidies are modeled by lower consumer prices. We cover rice, wheat, barley, corn, soybean, dairy, beef, pork, and poultry. Details on the policy instruments and information on the data are provided in an appendix available from the authors.
Demand for food is represented by an incomplete Linquad demand system calibrated to existing estimates of income and price elasticities for agricultural and food products (LaFrance;
LaFrance et al.). The sub-demand system for agricultural and food products is constructed assuming that other consumption goods are a composite single good. Homogeneity in prices of the complete system is accounted for by expressing all prices relative to the price index of the composite non-agricultural good. 4 Let x be an n-vector of agricultural goods on demand, q be an n-vector of corresponding consumptions prices, and q z be the consumption price of nonagricultural goods z. Variable R is total income or expenditure. The Linquad expression of the vector of Marshallian demands for agricultural and food goods is
corresponding to the expenditure function
The properties of this partial demand system are presented in LaFrance et al. It is a particularly attractive because of the possibility to calibrate the parameters using prior information. It is also rather flexible, due to the quadratic terms in prices, is consistent with the assumption of non-homothetic conditional preferences for agricultural goods, and there are no restrictions on individual income coefficients. In addition, the expenditure function (2) is the only way to derive demands linear in income and quadratic in price consistent with weak integrability (LaFrance et al.) The elements of the n-vectors ε and χ in equation (1), together with the elements of the n x n matrix V, are calibrated using the procedure described in the Appendix. The calibration imposes homogeneity of degree one in prices for e and symmetry of the Hessian of e. Concavity is verified locally.
The whole production sector of the economy is represented by a gross domestic product
, with z p denoting the price of non-agricultural netputs, and γ denoting a vector of fixed endowments and the technology and * p denoting the m-vector or world prices for agricultural inputs and outputs. (Samuelson; Dixit and Norman; and Woodland) .
We assume that gdp is separable into the agricultural and non-agricultural components,
where γ f denotes the agricultural endowments. Agricultural component Π is represented by a quadratic revenue function, which satisfies the usual properties of profit functions, function (Anderson and Neary, 1996) .
The BoT function, B, is defined as the sum of the value of a consumer's excess demand over income at external prices. It is built up from the consumer's expenditure function and the revenue (GDP) function, net of the government tax revenue function, or
where β is the sum of the tariff revenue on non-agricultural goods and the net financial transfers from abroad, both of which are assumed constant in the rest of the paper. We assume perfect 5 The Hessian W of Π provides the slopes of the price responses of the agricultural netput vector, y. To calibrate these responses we start from known estimates of own-and cross-price supply elasticities. We use the latter to derive corresponding slope coefficients W ii and W ij . Symmetry allows us to partially assign value to other elements of the matrix W since elements W ij and W ji are set equal. Then, homogeneity in price of degree zero of the netput vector (the sum of any row of matrix W multiplied by the price vector sums up to zero) allows to derive the response of each commodity supply i to the input price (nth column), W in , and eventually W nn (see the Appendix). competition and exogenous world prices. Derivative properties applied to e and gdp yield compensated consumption and netput quantities and their difference yields imported quantities.
The BoT function B includes a general equilibrium concept. Expenditure and revenue functions characterize the private sector structure of supply and demand of the distorted sectors analyzed in the economy. However, because of the tax revenue raised by distortions, both government and private behavior are summarized by B (p, q , u) , where we omit the constant
. The BoT function represents the external budget constraint and is equal to the net transfer required to reach a given level of aggregate domestic welfare, u, for a given set of domestic prices. Net government revenue from agricultural and food distortions is equal to
, where the fixed endowments are ignored to simplify notation. Consumption subsidies are captured by (q-p) negative, the cost of tariffs and taxes to consumers by (q-p*), and the producer prices, including support and subsidies, by (p-p*).
The gradients of partial derivatives of the BoT function with respect to domestic prices (p, q) preceded by a minus sign, , are the vectors of marginal welfare costs of domestic price distortions in production and in consumption, respectively. As dp and dq represent the producer and consumer price distortions, the total deadweight loss from these distortions is equal to minus the change in the foreign exchange to support u, or minus ( )
. This is the additional foreign exchange required to compensate for a change in distorted prices (dp, dq) in order to maintain the initial welfare level. Gradients ∇ are derived from totally differentiating B, and can be parameterized and estimated using the calibrated food demand and supply responses as explained in the Appendix.
Welfare Costs of Korean Agricultural Policy
The producer support estimate (PSE), measured by the OECD and expressed as a percentage of the value of production, reaches 73 percent in Korea compared to an OECD average of 34 percent in 2000. The Korean government provides a few direct payments and some input subsidies (fertilizers and interest subsidies). The main policy instruments are transfers from consumers, which account for 95 percent of the support to farmers (OECD 2001) . Many consider such forms of public intervention most distortionary and believe that they impose welfare costs on the society as a whole. Computed as consumption at domestic price/consumption at world prices using fixed consumption weights c Computed as production at domestic price/production at world prices using fixed production weights
The welfare effect of the various policy instruments can be derived from the BoT function by constructing the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), which is a welfare-based single tariff equivalent of the various policy instruments (Anderson and Neary 1996) . The TRI is the uniform scaling factor (or uniform price deflator ∆ ) that, when applied to period 1 prices, permits the representative consumer to attain his or her initial level of utility u 0 while holding the
The scalar ∆ is the uniform deflator, which, if applied to all imported goods prices, would ensure a constant balance of payments at the initial level of utility. Consider the case where the comparison is between a protected situation 0 and free trade (i.e., 
The uniform tariff equivalent, ), 1 / 1 ( 0 − ∆ = τ leads to period 0 welfare when applied to the set of world prices. 6 In our case, specific production and consumption price distortions exist, and the TRI methodology applies to any subset of price distortions in any sector of the economy. In our application, the uniform deflator is only applied to agricultural goods, and the non-agricultural tariffs are left unchanged. In the rest of the paper, ∆ is referred to as the uniform deflator and
, as the uniform unit price distortion. In the general case, without a general equilibrium model, the changes in ∆ have to be locally approximated. Total differentiation of B in equation (6) yields the percentage change in ∆ as a local approximation of the change in
where the derivatives of B are evaluated at
. That is, the change in the TRI deflator is a weighted average of the proportional changes in domestic prices. The weights are the shares of marginal deadweight loss due to each policy-induced price variation. The numerator of equation (3) measures the deadweight loss of the distortion changes and corresponds to the change in compensation measures (EV or CV) induced by dp and dq, or the change in the money metric utility for the same dp, dq up to normalization by the shadow price of foreign exchange (Anderson and Martin) . Table 2 provides the deadweight loss of the agricultural policy based on estimates of the components of Table 2 are in billion won at 1995 prices. The results provided in Table 2 show how costly the social transfers induced by Korean agricultural policy are in terms of welfare. The deadweight loss associated to the transfer of 10 wons to farmers amounts to roughly 5.8 wons. This is mainly caused by the particular policy instruments fully coupled to production and taxing consumers. High tariffs and administrative prices reflect the Korean preference for self-sufficiency objectives, regardless of the cost for consumers in sectors such as rice, pork, or poultry. Table 3 provides a measure of the TRI uniform distortion equivalent relative to free trade.
Equation (8) leads to the proportional change in the uniform tariff. When comparing the observed (distorted) situation 0 and the situation without public intervention, equation (9) provides an approximation of 
Scalar τ 0 would lead to the present welfare if the reference prices were increased by this amount (i.e., if all the components of p * , the vector of netput world prices, were increased by a
is the weighted sum of the unit distortion of consumption prices; the weights are the normalized deadweight loss associated with the unit distortion on a particular good. The comparison of this indicator (column 4 in Table 3 ) with the sum of each consumption distortion weighted by the consumption of each good n (column 5)
shows that the use of the marginal deadweight loss on consumption as a weight results in a larger overall index. The deadweight loss weighted average of the production distortions, Table 3 ) is only slightly larger than the average distortion weighted by the share in production (column 7). 
The Effect of Korean Agricultural Policy on Each Agricultural Sector
The relative impact of the various policies can be seen by simulating the effect of the whole set of taxes and subsidies on a particular commodity. This requires taking into account the specific measures for each input, such as irrigation subsidies, capital grants, subsidies for fertilizer use, etc. These inputs were allocated to each production using annual input/output coefficients (see Appendix) , and a reference input price was constructed for each commodity by allocating a detailed set of subsidies to the various agricultural productions based on the allocation used by the OECD for the calculation of the PSEs.
The deadweight loss in consumption corresponding to the commodity i is estimated by
, where the elements of p *i are the reference price in the case of the commodity i and the commodity-specific input and are the observed prices q o in other cases. A similar computation is made for estimating the deadweight loss on the production side.
The sum of the two components provides the total welfare effect associated with the government intervention on commodity i, which includes the market price support, the output enhancing subsidies, and the subsidies to the input used in the production of i (Table 4 , row 5). The contribution of the commodity-specific policy to the overall welfare is expressed as a percentage (Table 4 , row 6).
The effect of the policy on the revenue of agricultural producers can be derived from the agricultural component of the GDP function. The gradient of Π with respect to distorted prices,
, gives the amount of income transfer resulting from an increase in output (decrease in input) prices. By Hotelling's lemma, the gradient is the netput vector. That is, the income transfer effect of the agricultural policy is measured by
. A similar approach is used for estimating the income transfer effect of the agricultural policy on a commodity-specific basis.
The efficiency of the agricultural policy, defined as the overall cost to the society of transferring income to producers, can be estimated by the deadweight loss (on both the consumption and production sides) associated with one unit of the extra producer income resulting from the policy. It therefore is defined as one plus the ratio of the income transfer effect dp '
) and is provided in Table 4 , row 6 while estimates of income transfer are shown in row 7.
Rice growers get the largest transfer, followed by beef, pork, and milk producers. Rice policy has the highest contribution to foregone welfare, followed by beef, dairy, and pork. Beef has the lowest efficiency of transfer, at around 47 percent. The effect of government intervention on a particular product has implications in terms of substitution on both the production and consumption of other products when prices are influenced. The deadweight loss generated by a commodity-specific policy can be decomposed in terms of an own-price effect, a cross-price effect, and an input effect that measure the impact of the public policy (both on output and input through prices subsidies) on input use. Input distortions induce the largest welfare losses in rice production then in pork and beef sectors (row 11). However, deadweight losses induced by input subsidies are nearly negligible in all other sectors, except for dairy, and poultry. 
Trade Impacts of Korean Agricultural Policy and Mercantilism
As a member of the WTO, Korea had to convert quantitative restrictions on imports into bound tariffs, reduce these tariffs over an implementation period, open its market to imports under the minimum access provisions, and reduce the most trade-distorting forms of domestic support in producers from foreign competition in key sectors (IATRC 1997) . For example, Korea postponed the tariffication of rice for 10 years and negotiated an obligation to import only 4 percent of its consumption by 2004. In most of the staple foods, Korea has also kept import restrictions under domestic special rules. Prohibitive tariffs and administrative barriers still restrict imports of many agricultural goods to Korea (IATRC 1994). Self-sufficiency remains a policy objective (see Table 5 ), particularly in the rice sector, because of the cultural content of this good and because of the possible reunification with North Korea, which has been experiencing dramatic shortages of rice, making this issue particularly sensitive. From the point of view of the other countries involved in the trade negotiations, the variable of interest is the volume of imports and exports of the given country, rather than its welfare. This motivates an evaluation of the restrictiveness of trade policy using trade volume as the reference standard rather than the utility of the representative consumer (Salvatici, Carter, and Sumner) . Anderson and Neary (2000) have proposed the mercantilistic trade restrictiveness index (MTRI), which relies on the idea of finding a uniform tariff that yields the same trade volume as the original tariff structure. The definition of the MTRI shares the basic BoT framework of the TRI. It provides a metric of foregone trading opportunities induced by a set of distortions, while holding constant the balance of trade function but not utility.
Define m c as a vector of Hicksian import demand functions. This is the vector derived from the expenditure and revenue function: 
where π is used as a synthetic notation for either p or q vectors. The scalar import volume 
We use equation (11) and , as shown in equation (13):
Note that [ ]
is the shadow price of foreign exchange and M R x is the marginal income response vector for the n consumption goods (Anderson and Neary 2000) . 7 The
Marshallian MTRI is the most relevant index for measuring the overall trade impact of distortions. The MTRI gives the uniform price deflator µ which, when applied to the prices in the new equilibrium situation 1 yields the same volume (at world prices) of tariff-restricted imports as in the initial situation 0:
As was the case with the TRI, if p 1 equals its free trade values p * , the scalar (1/ µ -1) is the uniform tariff, which is equivalent in import volume to the initial tariff-distorted trade structure.
8
The effect of tariff changes in the MTRI can be approximated by using price derivatives of the
Using the vector of prices in the absence of distortion as the reference situation 1, and the observed prices as situation 0, the MTRI change is estimated using the expression of the demand system (2) and the sectoral GDP function (3) to retrieve the derivatives of the import demand functions (13). Table 6 provides the results. The change in the MTRI in equation (15) is a weighted sum of the proportional changes in consumption and production prices between the observed situation and the situation in the absence of public intervention. The weights are the marginal import shares of each price change.
7 The MTRI could be defined from the Hicksian volume import demand, which would help isolate the roles of substitution and income effects. The MTRI constructed from the compensated import demand function does not capture the whole effect of the tariff structure on imports, because it keeps the utility constant. Hence, it ignores the redistribution of the tariff revenues and taxes to the aggregate consumer. 8 In more general cases, the (1/µ-1) is the uniform tariff surcharge that when applied to the situation 1 prices would lead to the same volume of trade at world prices as in situation 0.
The uniform tariff equivalent has decreased dramatically during the 1990s. Recall that this is the tariff that should be applied to all goods under consideration (i.e., the list of the agricultural goods covered by the OECD PSEs) as this would give the actual level of imports in these goods. The decline by one-third of this indicator between 1990-92 and 1998-2000 is mainly a result of the surge in imports of corn, wheat, and soybeans at relatively low tariffs, and an increase in the imports of beef (see Table 5 ). Table 6 shows that weighting individual tariffs (or, more exactly, their impact on both production and consumption prices) by the marginal trade impacts, as expressed by the MTRI, leads to higher measures of trade restrictiveness than those found using standard importweighted average distortion.
Agricultural Policy in a Second-Best Framework
The special session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture was established for the purpose of Least-Developed Countries and NFIDCs" that accompanied the URAA. The "Decision" was supposed to address their concerns about FS.
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We saw in two previous sections that Korean food policy has costly welfare effects and frustrates mercantilist aspirations of trade partners by restricting agricultural trade. In this section, we take FS as a stated premise and investigate second-best distortion structures for several definitions of FS, including self-sufficiency.
Tax Structure for Self-Sufficiency Targets
First, consider Korea's negotiating claim that WTO commitments should allow it to pursue desired FS and rural development policies, by setting an objective of a given degree of selfsufficiency in the grain sector, in the meat sector, and for a set of commodities that Korea actually produces (meat, grains, dairy). Within a second-best framework, it is possible to optimize the tax structure for achieving a given level of self-sufficiency α=(α 1 ,...,α k ,… , α K ) for α k x k =y k , with the subscript referring to commodity k and with 0 ≤ α k ≤
1, for all k=1,…, K and
K≤n. From the targeting principle in a small economy (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan; Vousden) , the optimum second-best distortion structure calls for a production subsidy and a consumption tax that is equal to the α-share of the production subsidy. In addition, input 9 See, for example, the "Proposal on Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box by a Group of Developing Countries," G/AG/NG/W/13. See also the proposals by India in the area of FS in G/AG/NG/W/102, and the statement by Brazil, G/AG/NG/W/62. 10 The "Decision" was a response to the fears of many low-income countries that trade liberalization would open their domestic food markets to volatile world prices and threaten to undermine their FS. The "Decision" mentions four specific responses to this difficulty: food aid, favorable treatment with export credits, concessional financing for food imports, and technical and financial assistance to increase agricultural productivity and production. Matthews shows that in practice, the "Decision" did not address the main concerns of these countries. Makki et al. provide an interesting analysis of buffer stock and trade as a strategy to hedge price volatility.
subsidies are inferior to output subsidies and should not be used; that is, marginal rates of technical substitution should be left undistorted (Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan) .
Formally, consider the (specific) tax on consumption proportion of demand at the distorted prices:
where k -* p denotes world price for commodities other than k. Differentiating equation (16) and the BoT function leads to the following system of equations:
Rearranging leads to the expression of du, in terms of dq and the first-order condition:
The necessary condition for the second-best tax structure is that the relative consumption and production taxes verify
for all k. To solve for the second-best tax, define the excess demand for import relative to the self-sufficiency target k at non-distorted prices, based on equation (16):
This excess demand's response to second-best distortion
, for targeted self-sufficiency levels α k and α j for commodity k and j. The second-best distortion reduces the excess demand (over the target) and minimizes welfare losses relative to a free trade situation, as expressed by the following equations:
for K self-sufficiency multiple targets at level α k with k and j=1,…,K, and
to be minimized. The latter expression comes from the differentiation of the BoT function.
Minimizing welfare losses (19) subject to (20) yields the second-best τ structure.
In a first set of simulations, we define the second-best tax structure under the constraint of achieving the historical level of self-sufficiency over the 1998-2000 period. Simulations were conducted in two ways: imposing the observed levels of self-sufficiency for the whole set of commodities, and on a commodity per commodity basis. Table 7 shows that the actual structure of taxes and subsidies is close to the one recommended for maximizing welfare under the constraint of the existing rate of selfsufficiency. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show that the ratio of the actual tax on consumption and subsidy of production is close to satisfying condition
. This is particularly the case for soybeans, a commodity whose production is supported at very high levels, but for which consumers face relatively few taxes. This suggests that, if one focuses on a self-sufficiency objective, relatively little can be gained from a reform of the tax structure under these constraints, except for the input subsidies distorting marginal rates of substitution in production.
The gains from such a minor tax reform would be limited to 1,540 billion wons at 1995 prices.
Self-sufficiency targets mean restricting demand by imposing high prices to consumers, which can lead to the absurd situation where a country insulates itself from the vicissitudes of world markets by starving its consumers. Consider the hypothetical case in which Korea would decide to become self-sufficient in proteins. In spite of a very high level of subsidies (equivalent to paying producers more than six times the world prices), Korean production of soybeans covers less than 10 percent of actual consumption. Simulations with the above model show that any self-sufficiency target could be only achieved by choking demand, where very high consumption taxes would restrict the use of soybeans to a level that would be close to actual production. In Korea, self-sufficiency in pork and poultry production is achieved only by importing large quantities of soybeans and corn, which is less absurd than producing the feed domestically, but still less effective than importing meat in a land-scarce country. These commodities face a relatively low tariff, while tariffs on meat are prohibitive. On this basis, self-sufficiency can hardly be defended on national security grounds: corn is supplied mainly by a single country, and the world market for soybeans has experienced some shortages in the past. This suggests that Korean self-sufficiency objectives in these sectors merely reflect simple tariff escalation and effective protection of meat products and income transfer to these sectors.
Finally, although we do not address this point formally, self-sufficiency penalizes poor consumers the most because it imposes on them a large expenditure share for food; this policy hardly qualifies under the objective to "provide food access to all."
Tax Structure Supporting Production Targets for Food Security
A reasonable alternative would be to set production levels as targets in staple foods and rely on imports for additional sourcing of food items. Low or no tariffs on the consumer side would result in a higher demand, and the self-sufficiency ratio would decrease dramatically. However, domestic production would be maintained and would represent some insurance against world market uncertainty. The effect of this policy on domestic supply "security" would be the same as that of self-sufficiency policy, without distorting consumption decisions. In addition this policy would achieve a simlar income transfer for the targeted commodity, alleviating domestic political constraint.
Setting the constraint of achieving historical production levels leads to set output subsidies but no consumption tax. The corresponding level of output subsidy on a subset of targeted commodities k=1,…K can be found by solving the program
, where k y (p * +τ) is the level of production target for commodity k. 11 The elements of τ corresponding to non-targeted commodities are equal to zero.
Matrix
∂ y/∂p is KxK. Simulations show that this objective leads to production subsidies comparable to the present situation, which is not surprising, given the limited production impact 11 A targeted historical income transfer for a specific commodity k leads to a second-best ad valorem subsidy
which, expressed in won rather than in percent of world price, would be equivalent to the specific subsidy
of Korean input subsidies. In our welfare calculation we include the social cost of public funds that are necessary to pay the subsidies to the farm sector. We use the most recent available estimate of such cost for Korea, which is set to 1.1 (Dalsgaard) . The cost of public funds provides a more accurate measure of welfare gains of targeting because it accounts for the social cost of raising taxes elsewhere in the economy. Table 8 compares the deadweight loss (EV from free trade) in the actual situation (column 1). It also shows the trade implications of the alternative approaches to FS, which are full self-sufficiency (columns 3 to 5), historical levels of self-sufficiency as a target (columns 6 to 8), and historical production levels as a target, as resulting from a policy based on deficiency payments and no tariffs (columns 9 to 11). The third row of Table 8 gives the value of imports of all commodities at world prices under four situations. The fourth row provides an indicator of the trade restriction caused by the corresponding tax structure, as measured by the numerator of the MTRI. Finally, row 5 provides the uniform MTRI tariff, i.e., the tariff that should be imposed on all prices of tradable commodities in order to lead to the volume of trade at a world price that corresponds to a given tax structure.
Besides the welfare aspects, setting production targets rather than self-sufficiency targets represents a more palatable situation for mercantilist partners within the WTO and should facilitate the negotiation of large deficiency payments. This policy, which has been used in the main U.S. programs for years, makes it possible to avoid the present deadweight losses on the consumption side. This generates extra Korean imports and a loss of limited tariff revenue that can no longer be redistributed to consumers. However, the decrease in food costs for consumers, as well as the increase in consumption, results in significant welfare gains, more than sufficient to pay for the farm program as we include the cost of public funds in our welfare analysis.
Targeted deficiency payments in the staple grains sector (rice and barley) that achieve historical production levels, while removing tariffs on imports, would result in a significant welfare improvement (the deadweight loss would be reduced by 61 percent compared to the actual situation, to 2371 billion wons at 1995 prices). It would also result in a significant expansion of market opportunities. A synthetic indicator of these market opportunities, the MTRI uniform tariff equivalent would fall from 66 percent to 14 percent, and the volume of trade foregone would fall from 2,272 billion wons to 515 billion at 1995 prices.
As a final note, we undertook a sensitivity analysis, which is reported in the Appendix.
The simulations consider a 50-percent decrease and a doubling of the elasticities of the model, separately for supply, demand, and then jointly. The TRI and MTRI values are not sensitive to changes in elasticities. However and as expected, net welfare effects are more sensitive to changes in prices elasticities. A doubling of demand elasticities increases welfare losses by 40 percent, whereas a doubling of elasticities of supply increase welfare losses by 60 percent. The doubling of all elasticities is nearly additive, doubling the welfare losses.
Conclusions
Despite partial trade liberalization under the URAA, South Korea has been pursuing a policy of food self-sufficiency using trade restrictions and administrative prices in key agricultural and food markets, while following production targets with partial trade opening in lesser markets.
These measures are part of a stated policy of food security, or FS. We analyzed the impact of these market distortions on welfare and trade volume and we computed second-best distortions, which minimize the welfare cost of observed self-sufficiency and production objectives. We also computed second-best distortions for FS relying on domestic production and imports for all products. We rationalized these second-best distortions as what could be claimed as legitimate protection under an "FS" box in the new round of WTO negotiations.
Because Korea uses policy instruments that involve large production distortions and that impose high prices to consumers, we find that the present policies result in considerable welfare losses. The efficiency of transfers to producers is poor; each won transferred to farmers costs consumers and taxpayers roughly 1.6 won, and the objectives of self-sufficiency are obtained through a significant contraction of demand and high prices that are unlikely to make food access easier for the less-favored consumers.
Compared to second-best self-sufficiency policies, the observed system of taxes and subsidies is nearly "optimal" to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, similar objectives of FS could be achieved through production targets and open borders without the actual (considerable) welfare losses. The product target is nearly equivalent to an income transfer target and can be legitimized on either food security or political economy grounds. While the administration of programs such as deficiency payments might be difficult in some developing countries, which lack administration capacities and a large taxpayer basis, it is unlikely to impose more of an administrative burden than current policy, characterized by a high degree of state intervention.
There is growing pressure for consideration of an FS box in a future WTO agreement and a growing recognition from developed countries that some of the NFIDCs concerns in this area are legitimate. However, genuine concerns for FS should not be used as a justification for what is actually effective protection. From this point of view, the present Korean policy in the meat sector appears inconsistent. Most of the local production is achieved thanks to large amounts of imported feedstuffs, and the Korean policy corresponds mainly to tariff escalation and income transfer rather than to FS concerns. The setting of self-sufficiency targets appears to be dominated by other strategies when pursuing FS.
Reliance on free trade with production targets is more rational and could provide the same level of protection to producers and reduce welfare cost to consumers. We found that the welfare gains to such a policy are considerable, even when maintaining present levels of production. Such a reorientation of policy instruments also would increase demand and hence exports from mercantilist trade partners who find current Korean policy of nearly prohibitive agricultural tariffs unpalatable.
To conclude, our policy recommendation is that members of the WTO who endorse FS should advocate deficiency payments for their agricultural production and open their borders.
This strategy, which mirrors U.S. policy, would be much less antagonizing than strict selfsufficiency objectives for trade partners and more beneficial to consumers and small producers who are net buyers of food. Policy rents to farmers and landowners would be unaffected, which might help transition towards deficiency payments. Deficiency payments are a defendable second best policy if the constraint is FS. If the stated objective of FS dissimulates other motives, such as transferring income from consumers to farmers and landowners, deficiency payments are less efficient than pure lump-sum transfers. Nevertheless these production subsidies constitute a major improvement compared to blunt instruments such as trade barriers.
Data
The analysis is based on the commodities covered by the OECD PSE database, including rice, Output prices p and quantities y, consumption prices q and quantities x i, and reference prices p * (i.e., international prices at the border or other non-distorted prices) are obtained from the PSEs and CSEs of the OECD dataset. In the case of dairy products, as there is no trade in fluid product, the convention adopted by the OECD is to use the producer price in a reference country where there is no public support (e.g., New Zealand is used as a reference and to adjust for transportation costs, differences in fat content and to calculate a market price support; see OECD 2001). In the case of pork, the reference price is constructed on the basis of the Japanese wholesale price. Unpublished OECD data made it possible to allocate the various subsidies and to include them either as input price reduction or as output price supplement. The prices of input in the distorted situation are set to one and the non-reference input price is calculated using the (commodity-specific) input cost reduction. The allocation of input quantities to each product relies on the 1995 input-output table of the Bank of Korea. All prices are converted into 1995 prices deflated by the producer price index for agricultural, forestry, and fishery products and the consumer price index for food products.
The Linquad system parameters and the supply response system parameters are calibrated using the elasticities of the SWOPSIM (Static World Policy Simulation) database of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture; Namdoo; Chul-Hyun, Jeom-Bin; Sumner, Lee and Hallstrom; data from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute,; and from background (unpublished) documents of the OECD (1998). The price responses of inputs are recovered using economic properties such as homogeneity and symmetry conditions as explained below.
Calibration for the Linquad Demand System and the Supply system
The partial equilibrium model used in the simulations specifies the supply of outputs y and a demand system for agricultural products.
Linquad Demand Calibration
The demand system for food and agricultural products has a Linquad structure (Lafrance et al.) , leading to a system of Marshallian demands x i M for goods i=1,…,n described as
The system is calibrated using sets of exogenous own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities.
The calibration is done in two steps. First, point estimates of price and income derivatives of demand are obtained from the known parameters, then these responses, together with the observed demands are used to estimate the parameters of the model (e.g. the ε n and the v in ). That is, parameters ε and ν in equation (1) 
Supply Calibration
Recall that production decision are described by the profit function
The first derivatives of the profit function, Π , with respect to prices give the netput vector of agricultural production and the Hessian of Π provides the slopes of the price responses of the netput vector of the agricultural sector. To calibrate the supply response of the agricultural sector we start from known estimates of own-and cross-price supply elasticities. We use these to derive estimates of coefficients W ij , which are the slopes corresponding to these elasticities. Symmetry allows us to partially assign value to other elements of the matrix W since elements W ij and W ji are set equal by symmetry. Then, we use homogeneity in price of degree zero of the neptput vector (the sum of any row of matrix W multiplied by the price vector sums up to zero) to derive the implied response of each commodity supply i to the input price (nth column), W in , and finally by summing these over all commodities to obtain the own-price response of fertilizer demand, the element W nn .
Elasticities Values
The set of local elasticities at the reference point that are used to calibrate the parameters of equations (1) and (4) 
Sensitivity Analysis
Because the supply and demand systems are calibrated using prior information on elasticities found in the literature, uncertainty surrounds the estimates. Table A. 1. below shows the sensitivity to a broader range of elasticities than the ones that are used in the paper. The supply and demand systems were calibrated using much lower elasticities (i.e. a 50% decrease in their absolute value), and larger elasticities (i.e. a 100% increase in their absolute value). Clearly, the measure of welfare is sensitive to the absolute value of the supply and demand elasticities, as one would be expected since they affect directly the Harberger triangles. The TRI and MTRI uniform tariff equivalent are much less affected.
